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Preface
This paper investigates a new concept for launching small satellites to space. It first discusses small satellite capabilities, since many view them as being only applicable to special niche markets, current launch deficiencies for this market, development of the new launch system, and a conops for its application. My intention for writing this paper at ACSC is to show that there is a conops for affordable access to space. If low cost small space systems can be produced at the same cost as some of our other expendable assets (e.g. precision bombs ranging in price from $100 K -$1,000,000 each) the small space systems could provide a force enhancement function to our existing higher cost space systems. Some say that bigger, higher performance, longer lifetime space systems are the only way to move forward in space. I would say if we took this approach to the computer market, we would only have big mainframe computers and no personal computers today. However, I know proving that a low cost system can be developed and provide a useful capability is a challenge. Hopefully this paper is a start. 
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to produce a proof of concept conceptual design of a nanosatellite launcher. To date, several nanosatellites (< 10 kg) have flown, demonstrating remote sensing in space and on the ground, 3-axis control, and small bandwidth communications.
However, as a system, they currently are not the best option due to the current market high launch costs. It is the purpose of my research to show that a low cost launch system could be developed. My approach is to use "off the shelf" technology and limit the dimensions and mass of the system to integrate onto existing USAF air platforms. I chose the GBU-28 due to its high volume and mass, and capabilities to horizontantly integrate with many air platforms. Taking its core shell, I will show that a system can fit into its dimensions and take a 6.5 kg satellite from 40,000 ft to a 430 km orbit. The paper will describe on-going small satellite programs, showing their capabilities; discuss current launch vehicle options, discuss my design, and conclude by showing a conops for this rapid system to provide a remote sensing constellation to the warfighter or educate young space professionals.
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Introduction
If I don't do it, you can kill me! -Dr Wernher von Braun, after being asked by Vice President Johnson on the feasibility of his technical leadership of the manned mission to the Moon.
Any space program has four basic elements: (1) spacecraft systems, (2) ground operations systems, (3) integration systems, and (4) launch systems. Twenty years ago, putting in place any of these elements would have been viewed as a serious challenge. But today, things are different.
The paper will examine each of these elements, focusing on the current most challenging: launch systems, specifically for small satellites.
Commercial advances in electronic and micro-mechanical technologies have made it possible to develop tiny (<10 kg) "nano-satellites" with significant capabilities that can be constructed in very short periods of time and at extremely low cost, opening up many new possibilities for space exploration. A good example is the University of Surrey's (Guildford, UK) first nano-satellite: SNAP-1, shown in Figure 1 , which was launched in June 2000 to a 700 km low earth orbit. It is a 6.5 kg spacecraft with advanced, UK-developed, GPS navigation, computing, propulsion, and attitude control technologies. Its primary payload is a machine vision system capable of inspecting other spacecraft. SNAP-1 had the following specifications: The second element of a space program is ground operations systems. These too are now relatively cheap and easy to establish ($150 K). The US Air Force Academy Space Operations Center (SOC) for the FalconSAT-2 mission (see Appendix A) consists of several PC's, a rack of RF communications gear and some antennas mounted on the roof. As of this writing, cadets are training in the SOC using an engineering model of the satellite as a hardware-in-the-loop simulator. 4 The third element of a space program, integration systems, includes all of the software needed to tie together mission lifecycle. Integration systems include everything from CAD and analysis tools to telemetry interpretation software. In the current state of the art, all of these tools exist in some form or another (either commercial or custom made) as separate packages, most of which do not easily talk to each other. Unfortunately, this can cause difficulty in mission operations. For example, if a small satellite is tasked to provide more persistent coverage of a remote sensing area, the data must integrate into the other ground, space or airborne platforms and not have its own "stove pipe" operating system.
The fourth element of a space program, launch systems, is the focus of this research paper.
The success of small satellites hinges on low-cost, responsive launch opportunities, opportunities that currently do not exist in the U.S. Table 1 shows the current US launch vehicles -payload capability and ROM launch costs. 
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Since the target recurring cost for this new class of small satellites would be in the $250K -$1M range, these launch prices make it difficult to justify a dedicated launch at the cost mentioned in Table 1 . Thus, small satellites typically fly as hitchhikers along with another larger system that pays for most of the launch cost. This approach generally works well, and has been used by all USAFA satellites. It has been demonstrated repeatedly with the Ariane IV and Ariane V launch vehicles in Europe. The ASAP ring (Ariane Structure for Auxiliary Payloads) has the capability to launch 6 small satellites at once. If the ring is full, the cost to each satellite manufacturer is about $250,000. If only one satellite is on the ring, then that satellite must pay the full costs for the ring. A similar concept will be employed for the EELV. The ESPA (EELV Secondary Payload Adapter) will allow up to 6 small satellites (up to 400 lb each) to be launched along with a primary payload. The first launch of ESPA is slated for March 2006 and will include the FalconSAT-3 spacecraft (see Appendix A). As this is the maiden flight, recurring costs are still to be determined, but they are targeted to be in the same range as the ASAP.
Launches are also available as secondary payloads on Russian vehicles at a cost of approximately $5,000 per kg. However, neither the ASAP nor Russian options are available to USAF-built satellites due to US foreign launch restrictions on DOD built payloads and spacecraft. 6 Unfortunately, in all of these options, two things stand in the way : (1) launch frequency, and (2) launch cost. For example, to provide USAFA cadets some space mission experience in their academic careers, we must achieve a launch frequency of at least 4 to 6 times per year. At this frequency, the cost needs to be in the range of $250k to $500k per launch. At roughly $250k per satellite and $250k per launch, at a rate of 6 per year, that gives a ballpark program cost (excluding operations) of $3M per year. This recurring cost is not out of line given that the Academy spends over $10M per year on its flying programs. How can we achieve responsive and low cost lift?
One possible solution that always comes up is a single stage to orbit concept. If a system can be developed that is completely reusable, and has minimal operational and maintenance costs, i.e. quick turn around, just add fuel-the argument goes-it would offer a low cost solution to launch, just based upon the frequency of use. Unfortunately, Figure 5 shows the technology required to produce such a Thus, there is a niche for a responsive nano-satellite launch capability in the United States.
My approach is to design a vehicle using as much "COTS" technology as possible, similar to the approach taken in the University of Surrey and FalconSAT program (see Appendix A). If a program requires "leaps" in technology, it is hard to justify that it will be responsive. We would also like the vehicle to be accessible enough to serve as an educational tool for cadets. One proposed design concept is to develop a standard vehicle that could be launched from many of the current USAF air platforms. This approach is possible by constraining the vehicle and payload to meet the volume and mass constraints of one of the bigger bombs in the inventorythe GBU-28. 
Chapter 2 Discussion
A Single Stage to Orbit launch vehicle will never work.
-Dr Wernher von Braun
The use of small missiles for use in space is not a new idea. After the Soviet Union had The program was terminated in 1988, mainly for political reasons 3 . Table 2 Thus there is precedent for using a smaller missile for space applications. In keeping with current Air Force doctrine of "transformation" and "horizontal integration," in developing the concept of operations for the nano-satellite launch vehicle concept, I decided to constrain the vehicle's mass and volume so it could be flown on many platforms. By making this decision, integration of this vehicle into the inventory would be minimized since crews would already have been trained to handle such a system -from maintenance handling on the ground to writing of flight plans and tech orders.
The missile that I decided to use for the conceptual baseline is the GBU-28. I chose it due to its flight heritage on the F-15, planned use for the F-22, and it can fly on bomber/cargo aircraft.
A picture of the missile is shown in Figure 7 and its specifications are shown in Table 3 . The point of the analysis is not to propose using any of the existing components of this missile, just use its mass and volume as a footprint for the design of the system. Table 4 shows the aircraft in the inventory that were considered for the deployment of the system. Ones that were not mentioned are already taxed quite heavily as far as payload available -U-2, TR-1--or are not suited for the mission -F-16, A-10. However, many aircraft are capable as shown in The analysis also assumes that the cargo/bomber aircraft would deploy the rocket at a low angle of attack since this is their normal concept of operations for such missions. This will produce steering losses and require a slightly higher velocity requirement. For the fighter aircraft, I assumed a 60-degree angle of attack or pitch angle is feasible. When the ASM-135 was launched, the pilot had the aircraft at Mach 0.934 6 . For the initial analysis, the rocket is assumed to start at rest. This assumption would allow the fighter aircraft to hold a high angle attack at a higher launch altitude, since higher speeds would possibly take them out of their performance regime if they were at high Mach and high altitude at the time of deployment. For the lower flying aircraft a zero take off velocity is reasonable; since at this point we are just producing a baseline concept for feasibility, it is better to have more design margin. Table 3 . Off the shelf composite technology is required if a lower launch altitude is chosen. ∆V's took into account gravity and drag losses. Term definitions: ∆V is change in velocity needed to get to orbit, Payload mass is the mass of the satellite, Total mass is the mass of the launch vehicle that is deployed which includes the structure, satellite and propellant, Inert mass is the structural mass divided by the structural mass and total propellant mass, Launch and Final altitudes are the initial and final altitudes (400 km is high enough to be in orbit for weeks to months, depending on the solar conditions, and Isp is the rocket engine efficiency (defined as the Rocket Thrust/propellant mass flow rate x the gravitational constant).
GBU-28 Specifications
The results shown in Table 5 indicate that all current off the shelf technologies are feasible for a single stage system. The inert mass fraction of 0.06 represents composite material technology (available today) for the structure, and 0.08 is stainless steel. The Isp's of 295-300 sec represent current high-end chemical solid rocket motor technology performance. Since we want the concept to integrate with existing aircraft, moving to a liquid or hybrid program will not justify the added development cost. Staging could also be considered, but would also make the system more complex.
The purpose of this top-level analysis was to show basic system feasibility. Thus with these preliminary results, I decided to produce a conceptual design for this application.
Concept of Operations
Champions don't make excuses! -Alison Streeter MBE, Queen of the English Channel and world record holder with 40 successful crossings
In this Chapter, I will present a more detailed design of the launch concept and then propose two mission scenarios where it could be applied. Table 6 shows the specific design results of the launch system. The fantastic result of Table 6 is that everything required to build the launch vehicle is within the grasp of today's technology. The payload mass represents the 6.5 kg SNAP nanosatellite discussed earlier, and rocket engine technology is a chemical solid rocket motor.
The sold rocket motor has a specific impulse of 282 sec. Specific impulse is the "miles per gallon" term used for rocket technology; it is the rocket's thrust (output energy) divided by the mass flow rate (input energy). Solid rockets are not as efficient as liquid chemical engines, but are storable (density is about the same as a pencil eraser) and simple (no pressurization system needed -just need an igniter and a case that is strong enough to handle the propellant loading and pressure while the rocket is firing).
For this scenario, I assumed launching at 40,000 ft out of a C-17 to an orbital height of 430 km. I chose 40,000 ft since that is the height that supports the current C-17 flight operations plan. The final orbital altitude is good for remote sensing and should allow operations on the order of months, before orbital perturbations and drag gradually cause the satellite to lose altitude and re-enter. The velocity requirement to reach a 430 km orbit is 8.07 km/s. At 430 km of altitude, the orbital speed required is 7.65 km/s. However, to reach this orbital height from 40,000 ft, we must overcome the force of gravity and drag, hence we need to add more velocity which increases our velocity requirement (500 m/s to overcome gravity and 3% of the final velocity required for drag, which gives 8.07 km/s). These numbers were derived from empirical studies of previous launches, so are good "ballpark" numbers for design 1 . The rocket equation is a way to look at the velocity required, and make sure the rocket has enough energy from the propellant to get the spacecraft to orbit.
Equation ( Table 6 , that we have enough energy to get to orbit with one stage, with one 182 second burn. This is a nice feature; even though staging does increase performance, it also increases complexity and cost.
I also assumed since the deployment was from a C-17, that the initial rocket velocity would be zero since it would be dropped from the back end. Even though my calculations show that the concept can fit on the rail of an F-15 or other fighter (see Figure 8) , the nice feature of keeping the system to the size of an existing missile, is that you have flexibility. I also looked at the added performance we could get by using the velocity of the aircraft. If we deploy at Mach 1, we get an additional 0.33 km/s of velocity, so we could decrease the total velocity required to ~ 7.8 km/s. We could use the same volume, and either increase the payload mass (up to ~ 16 kg from 6.5 kg) or increase the orbital height. However, deploying at Mach 1 could create some separation issues, which I will talk about later in this Chapter. Table 6 : Conceptual Design Results, the system works! It can achieve space altitude for a nanosatellite class payload and use technology that exists today. Table 6 . The rocket is deployed at 12 km, fires for 182 seconds, and then reaches its final altitude of 430 km after coasting for 28 seconds.
In April 2003, Aviation Week wrote an article on a similar concept under investigation at AFRL/VS. AFRL/VS presented a paper at the IEEE conference in Wyoming in March and
described the use of a 10,000 lb rocket to launch 100 kg microsatellites into 760 km orbits from an F-15 traveling at Mach 1 3 . Although I like the approach since it is similar to mine, their concept does have some issues. Since they required the rocket to weigh 10,000 lbs, they must put the rocket on the underbelly of the F-15 with only 1" clearance from the ground. This could create "interesting" issues as maintenance crews try to mount it to the underbelly. The other problem is that the aerodynamics of such a big rocket on the underbelly of the F-15 could create problems. The airflow under the F-15 has been unpredictable 4 . Different body stations on the platform have witnessed this effect. There tends to be air spill over from inlets on the smooth underbelly. This has created sometimes-unpredictable airflow under the belly, which sometimes causes bombs to drop and rise after deployment -usually just the non-aerodynamic dumb bombs. This has been worked out due to testing, but such a big system, flying supersonic, could create operational issues. According to Dr Preston Carter of DARPA, head of microsatellite launch concepts, he has lost interest in this concept due to the technical complications even though the article reported that the concept was being funded under his organization 5 . Figure 10 shows a drawing of my design. The more detailed calculations that support this drawing can be found in Appendix C. Besides verifying the volume fits for the velocity required to orbit, I also verified that the regression or burn rate also supports the burn time required of 182 seconds. However, a detailed trajectory simulation will also be needed to look at guidance and control for final orbit insertion, but as I have stated, my assumptions have allowed margin in the design. Finally, and most important, range support, basing and logistics support would need to fully explored. Since it is air launched, we have the flexibility of launching into many orbital inclinations since we can choose our launch window by just flying to the latitude of choice -but the range support must also be there. Recall, one of the goals is to have students participate in as many aspects of the launch operations as possible, so basing and safety considerations would be paramount. Such a system could give persistent remote sensing at 10 m resolution, which could provide data that could be integrated/compared with other remote sensing assets with higher resolution.
The key is that the small satellite operating system must be the same as the other assets so data can be readily transferred and not go through some type of "translator" for integration.
Communications could also be an application, with data transmitted at the kByte level -possibly upgraded as technology improves. The concept of operations would be that the system would be launched from an air asset, and control would then be given to the theater commander, even though the assets will only be in theater at certain times. The estimated orbital lifetime at 430 km will be worst-case 6 months, up to 1 year, all depending on the drag parameters of the orbit.
The small satellite could also have a propulsion system for stationkeeping, or to keep the satellites in the right phase (separation from other satellites to maintain persistence--one leaves the theater, the next one arrives, etc). Since these assets are "expendable", total cost should be limited to the current expendable assets used in the theater -missiles and bombs. With SNAP costing $750 K starting from scratch (complete cost), ground stations at $100 K each, and a target launch cost of the new system to be $250K (all existing technology), this should be feasible. In order to provide affordable access to space, I propose that the launcher be initially constructed at the Air Force Academy with a team of engineers, faculty, and cadets.
How could this vehicle be used as part of the "space for all" program? Current Academy missions are much larger than the 6.5-10 kg missions used in the above analysis. Infrequent launch opportunities dictate that maximum utility must be gained from every launch. This drives the program to include more payloads, requiring more power, data, etc., driving size up.
However, there are no technical reasons why a 10-kg spacecraft size could not become a new standard. As the primary mission for these launches would be cadet education and training, these "TrainingSATs" could be launched several times per year, providing a continuous constellation for cadets to practice operations. For example, an even simpler 30-m resolution camera onboard would give cadets practice in tasking "reconnaissance" satellites and downloading and interpreting the data. Beyond this rudimentary capability, it is easy to imagine other applications, such as attitude control demonstration, and formation flying.
The first of these would be a constellation of "weather buoys" taking simple but continuous measurement of the little understood ionospheric plasma environment that greatly affects military communications capability. Finally, these nano-satellites could serve as platforms to gain flight heritage for new technologies. With satellites, an operations center, integration systems and a responsive nano-satellite launch platform, a fully integrated space program would provide a continuum of education and training opportunities while providing an infrastructure to support R&D for the warfighter. This concept is illustrated in Figure 11 . And as a reminder, the University of Surrey did fly a 3-axis controlled imaging satellite with propulsion capability, with a total mass of 6.5 kg. 
Chapter 4 Conclusion
Sometimes doing the impossible is fun.
-Walt Disney
The current space program at the Academy provides cadets with a unique opportunity for hands-on experience with real satellite and sounding rocket missions. In its current form, the program could continue to evolve steadily, building and launching a 50-kg satellite every 2-3 years and a sounding rocket every year or so with roughly 50 cadets per year benefiting from the experience. But to achieve the vision of "space for all," a transformation is needed. Leveraging existing COTS nano-satellite technology, constellations of 10-kg class TrainingSATs, space buoys and other types of missions could be readily developed at low cost.
But the key element of this program is a low-cost, regular access to low Earth Orbit. This paper presented first order analysis indicating that an air-launched vehicle using existing propulsion technology could be developed and based from a variety of platforms in the AF inventory. The question remains whether sufficient commitment within government and industry can be found to invest in the necessary development costs of such a vehicle. The Ariane ASAP platform revolutionized the small satellite industry in the 1980's, taking micro-satellites from simple toys to powerful workhorses, and allowing satellite builders to push the state of the art to the point where, today, we can easily imagine a new class of 10-kg satellites pushing the state of the art even further. Using education and training of future space leaders at USAFA as the initial mission driver, this capability could quickly be expanded for education and training throughout DoD, industry and universities. Further down the road, a responsive, low-cost nanosatellite operational system could also offer transformational capabilities to future combatant commanders.
the curriculum to accommodate increasingly more ambitious space projects. and Wake Studies-Long Duration (CHAWS-LD) experiment which was designed to measure electric potential created by a spacecraft's wake to examine how charging varies throughout an orbit. The CHAWS-LD sensor was designed to assess the hazards for spacecraft operations in the wake of larger bodies. Unfortunately, a power system problem became apparent soon after deployment. Despite repeated attempts to recover the spacecraft by the cadet/faculty operations team, the mission was declared a loss after only one month.
Although it was considered a technical failure, FalconSAT-1 represented an academic success for the program as cadets participated from "cradle to grave" in a real-world mission with an all too real-world outcome. Cadets designed and built FalconSAT-1's payload and subsystems, and they were integral in the mission operations from devising operations plans to participating in the launch campaign. Cadets also manned the Academy's ground station during overhead passes of a satellite not operating under nominal conditions. Cadets involved with trouble-shooting the anomalies soon after deployment certainly gained deep insight into system functions and operations.
The lessons learned from FalconSat-1 motivated significant structural change to the Academy's long-term program, with the intention of building a program first and a satellite second. Thus, the new approach has been to focus on building up infrastructure, relying heavily on off-the-self hardware to provide a firm foundation to allow the design to evolve steadily over the course of several missions. When approached as a blank sheet of paper, the construction of an entire satellite is an entirely open ended problem with potentially thousands of considerations and interdependent design options. In a prototype only satellite program, design changes in one basic component will cause many time-consuming design iterations throughout the rest of the design. Eliminating options of the core components from the initial design process allows for continued engineering and analysis work while reducing the amount of follow-on design iteration processes. This allows for a program to be designed in parallel from the standard sets of components rather than having subsystems designs relying on other designs in a design-string that is based on the initial program requirements.
However, even with the constraint of having standardized core subsystems in mission design there is still no limit to the available mission payload and peripheral design options. For these reasons, the USAF Academy has adopted new off-the-self hardware in the development of FalconSat-2. The FalconSat-2 design is based on commercial hardware, which can be readily adapted and enhanced to meet future payload requirements and secondary launch opportunities.
Just as there has been a movement in the aviation industry towards modular sub-components, the idea of easy design, replacement and repair of modules is something the new FalconSAT-N program is evolving towards.
FalconSAT-2 is the first in this new series of modular microsatellites designed, built, tested, and operated by cadets at the USAF Academy. Due to difficulties and complications experienced with FalconSat-1, a major change in design philosophy was adopted for FalconSAT-2 and subsequent missions. This philosophy hinged on reducing the overall mission risk and time needed for design development. Rather than having students design the entire spacecraft "from scratch," we have attempted to significantly constrain the design problem by adopting the core subsystems available as commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items.
The specific COTS solution was developed by Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL), UK for their Surrey Nanosatellite Application Program (SNAP). FalconSAT-2 has experienced enormous success in the design process and has allowed students a multitude of engineering challenges to be resolved. With this COTS basis, three satellites will be developed to test and verify the system design before launch. However, these will be completed in nearly the same amount of time as the ground-up proto-flight method employed during FalconSat-1. As of this writing, FalconSAT-2 is complete and awaiting launch as shown in Figure 12 .
The spacecraft was designed for launch on the Space Shuttle via the Hitchhiker Pallet Ejection In addition to building and operating small satellites, USAFA has a parallel program to build and launch small sounding rockets. The goals of FalconLAUNCH are to first provide cadets another opportunity to "learn space by doing space," and second to one day provide a platform to The ultimate vision of the Academy's space program is "space for all," meaning that every graduate should be given the opportunity, some time during the four year cadet experience, to actively take part in some aspect of a space mission-design, build, test, launch or operations.
While this vision may sound unrealistic given the current state of small space programs, it is useful to look back 20 years or so in the Academy's history. At that time, another vision was laid out: "soar for all," whereby every cadet would have the opportunity to solo in a sailplane sometime before they graduate. Today that vision is reality. Nearly 1000 cadets per year, either during the year or during summer training periods, participate in the soaring program, earning their cadet soaring wings. Those who participate early in their cadet careers, and who show a particular aptitude and interest, can go on to become cadet instructor pilots, teaching the underclassmen. In this way, the program is largely self-sustaining with older cadets mentoring younger ones and providing overall leadership in the program. Of course, to sustain a soaring program of this level requires an investment by the institution in manpower and infrastructure.
However, the Academy's mission is to motivate young men and women to become career officers in the USAF. Most graduates go on to be career pilots, and most of the rest who do not fly themselves take on support roles for the flying mission. For the flyers, the cadet soaring experience helps to hone those important skills early and gives them an early taste of the flying mission. Even more important, for those cadets who do not go on to fly, their brief experience in sailplane cockpit gives them a visceral understanding of the flying mission. 
